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Abstract 
This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. 
We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries 
should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which 
institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How 
centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? 
What governance framework and political institutions would be needed?  
In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as 
necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional 
economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order 
to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted 
either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting 
under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller 
banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be 
established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance 
system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at 
least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with 
significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely 
separately from fiscal union and political union.  
The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps 
towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis 
countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has 
significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early 
and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the 
tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development 
of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the 
system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary 
European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other 
authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in 
case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country 
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concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all 
participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in 
the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if 
necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member 
states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, 
market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address 
any eventuality.   
 
INTRODUCTION  
The concept of European banking union was recently endorsed by European leaders as a component 
for solving the euro crisis. In order to “strengthen economic union and make it commensurate with 
the monetary union”, the European Council on 23 May asked president Van Rompuy and other top 
European officials to identify “building blocks”, among which “a more integrated banking supervision 
and resolution, and a common deposit insurance scheme” – in short, a banking union. On 19 June the 
G-20 leaders expressed support to “the intention to consider concrete steps towards a more 
integrated financial architecture, encompassing banking supervision, resolution and recapitalization, 
and deposit insurance”.  
The rationale for a banking union complementing monetary union is straightforward. Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was constructed on the basis of two pillars: a monetary pillar 
with the independent and price-stability oriented European Central Bank (ECB), and a fiscal pillar 
oriented towards fiscal discipline with a modicum of coordination. It has no financial policy 
component apart from the ban of capital controls and the promotion of a single market for financial 
services, both of which apply to the whole EU, and it has no banking component, apart from those 
arising from the operation of monetary policy and the common banking regulation and common 
standards on deposit insurance. The ECB itself has few financial stability competences.  
Even before the crisis there were reasons to question whether this bare-bones model was sufficient.  
It was known that there was an inherent contradiction between pan-European banking and exclusive 
national responsibility for bank crisis resolution2. Recent developments have exposed further 
weaknesses: 
 First, the previously integrated euro-area financial market has entered a process of 
fragmentation. Capital that was supposed to move as freely across countries as across regions 
has stopped flowing from North to South, which has resulted in within-EMU surprise balance-of-
payment crises3. Banks that were European in quiet times have become national in crisis times as 
they depend on national governments for support. Furthermore, they have been encouraged by 
national authorities to cut cross-border lending. This is understandable from a national 
viewpoint, as taxpayers have little reason to pay for the consequences of imprudent lending to 
foreigners, but lethal for the euro-area financial market. Integration of the interbank market is on 
the retreat within the euro area4. This, in turn, has increased the exposure of the ECB that has 
become a financial intermediary replacing the interbank market. 
 Second, there has been since 2008 a strong correlation between banking and sovereign solvency 
crises. Especially but not only in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Italy, sovereign solvency concerns 
have affected banks and bank solvency concerns have affected sovereigns5. The reasons for this 
correlation include a strong home bias in the composition the banks’ sovereign bond portfolios, 
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the sovereigns’ individual responsibility for bailing-out banks6, and the increasingly apparent re-
emergence of country risk7. This two-way correlation creates vicious circles that the ECB cannot 
quell, because a federal central bank cannot be mandated to assist particular sovereigns and 
because the ECB cannot address solvency concerns and stay committed to its primary target.  
 Third, the crisis has made it increasingly clear that a fragmented approach to banking policy 
renders it more difficult to minimize losses to taxpayers. Asset ring-fencing and risk-shifting 
result in coordination failures that increase the overall public cost.8 Furthermore, individual 
countries may either be prevented by neighbours from imposing losses on bondholders for fear 
of contagion, as was the case of Ireland in late 2010; or if they do impose losses, their other 
domestic banks risk being at a disadvantage in the integrated European market, a factor that led 
Denmark to amend its policy framework to make it more creditor-friendly in 2011.   
These developments undermine the foundations of monetary union and question its very rationale. 
They explain why the banking union theme has emerged as one of the key ways to respond to the 
incompleteness of EMU. Centralising responsibility for deposit insurance, bank supervision, and crisis 
resolution would contribute to its resilience by cementing financial integration and reducing the 
potential for sovereign-banking crises correlation. 
To create a banking union is however a step of high significance with major ramifications for financial 
integration within the euro area, public finances, governance and, ultimately, political integration. It 
requires very careful design and involves many choices, both as regards the steady state and the 
transition to it.  
The aim of this paper is to review choices and assess alternatives. We start in section 1 with overall 
considerations on the principles of banking policy. We then draw an outline of what a European 
banking union would be in section 2, and review in section 3 the key choices and options involved. 
We take up transition issues in section 4. Conclusions are presented in section 5.  
 
SECTION 1 - Principles of banking policy 
The central purpose of banking policy is to ensure a proper functioning of financial intermediation 
exercised by the banking system. To achieve this goal, banking policy aims to prevent banking crises 
and, when a crisis occurs, to intervene to prevent the crisis of an individual bank giving rise to a crisis 
of the banking system. To ensure proper crisis prevention and management, a widely shared view of 
banking policy describes it as resting on four pillars: regulation, supervision, deposit insurance and 
bank resolution. 
 Banking regulation aims to increase the resilience of banks to withstand shocks and ultimately, to 
reduce the externality resulting from the fact that bank failures can impose large losses on 
society that may lead governments to bail-out bank creditors. Other aspects of banking 
regulation, such as on preventing money-laundering or consumer protection, are motivated by 
other considerations than financial stability. 
 Bank supervision allows governments to closely monitor banks’ activities and risk-taking to 
ensure that they are managed in a prudent way and check the build-up of risk. As with 
regulation, its ultimate aim is to prevent financial instability and minimize risks to the taxpayers. 
It can involve significant reporting requirements, and be intrusive with supervisors permanently 
embedded in supervised banks’ premises.  
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 Deposit insurance is intended to counter the threat of a bank run by protecting the value of 
deposits. Depending on countries, it can be either pre-funded by the financial industry through a 
dedicated fund, or post-funded as a consequence of crises. It always has an implicit or explicit 
government backing, because even a large pre-funded insurance may be insufficient to cover 
certain extreme crisis scenarios. 
 Bank resolution authority and capacity should allow for the resolution of banks without severe 
systemic disruptions and ideally also without exposing the taxpayer to losses. The US Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)’s resolution authority that developed since the 1930s for 
depositary institutions is an early example. If a resolvability assessment concludes that a financial 
institution is no longer viable, the resolution authority should have strong powers to stabilize the 
core functions of systemic importance, in particular deposits and essential intermediation 
functions; to preserve the value of assets by preventing fire sales; to force junior and senior 
unsecured creditors to share losses, with debt restructuring, debt-equity swaps and “bail-ins” 
among the possible instruments. While the crisis has spurred increasing international consensus 
on the desirability of a special resolution regime for financial institutions and the key attributes it 
should include (FSB, 2011), many countries, including some in the EU and euro area, still lack 
such a policy framework. The European Commission has recently made proposals that would 
partly harmonize this policy area across the EU (European Commission, 2012).  
The four pillars are highly connected. To be effective, strong political authority and executive 
capacity are needed. Decisions taken by the supervisory and resolution authority often imply 
significant distributional effects and may also imply significant risks to the public purse. They must be 
legitimized and held accountable, which typically involves carefully designed governance and active 
parliamentary oversight. The division of labour between central banks, supervisors and finance 
ministries differs across countries, even though the central bank always plays an important role as 
the ultimate provider of liquidity, not only in case of a (systemic) bank run but also in the period 
during which the relevant authorities make an assessment of solvency and resolvability of a bank.  
Banking policy in federations is organized at different levels depending on the degree of fiscal, 
political and economic integration. Box 1 summarizes the cases of the US, Canada, and Switzerland.  
 
BOX 1: BANKING POLICY IN FEDERATIONS 
In the US, the FDIC covers all deposits in banks and savings associations, whereas deposits in credit 
unions are insured by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). Both are organized at a 
federal level and backed by the United States government.  The FDIC also acts as the resolution 
authority for depositary institutions, and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 grants it similar authority over 
systemically important non-bank financial institutions. Federal-level supervisory functions are divided 
between the Federal Reserve, the Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the NCUA. Most of the banking system is subject to 
federal regulation even though some banks are chartered and regulated at the state level. The OCC is 
the primary federal regulator of national banks. The primary federal regulator of state-chartered 
banks is the Federal Reserve Board if they are members of the Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC 
otherwise.  
In Canada, the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) coexists with provincial deposit 
insurances. Coverage of the provincial deposit insurance varies by province. Provincially chartered 
credit unions cannot become members of the CDIC. In terms of regulation and supervision, the 
federal level plays a strong role with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), 
which is separate from the Bank of Canada, and the CDIC. Securities dealing activities are regulated 
at a provincial level and there is no national securities regulator.  
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In Switzerland, the federal level exercises most banking policy competencies. The Swiss National 
Bank (SNB) oversees systemically important payment and securities settlement systems. The main 
bank supervisor is the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), which also supervises 
cantonal banks and is separate from the SNB. However, some cantonal banks have their liabilities 
guaranteed by the Canton beyond the national deposit insurance guarantee. The national deposit 
insurance fund is funded ex-post and limited by law to CHF 6bn. There is no explicit government 
backstop to the deposit insurance system. 
 
 
SECTION 2 – A European banking union 
The EU has a more integrated banking policy framework than any other existing regional 
arrangements, but even so most policy instruments remain at the national level. Regulation is 
increasingly harmonized following successive Banking Directives, the Financial Services Action Plan of 
1999, and more recent moves towards the formation of a “single rulebook”, but some regulations 
remain set at the national level as illustrated by the Vickers Commission proposals in the UK. 
Supervision is mostly national, even though the creation of the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 
2011 has strengthened coordination and mediation mechanisms. Deposit Insurance is only partly 
harmonized: a minimum coverage of EUR 100,000 was introduced in 2009, but deposit insurance 
systems, structures, and funding patterns vary widely across member states. Crisis resolution is 
national: many member states have not yet introduced a special resolution regime for banks, and the 
coordinating role of the EBA in this area remains untested. In addition, the European Systemic Risk 
Board provides EU-wide macroprudential oversight. Liquidity policy for banks is exercised at the euro 
area level by the European Central Bank, but the Eurosystem’s national central banks retain the 
capacity to engage in national Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) and have recently been given 
additional discretion for collateral assessment.  
Given this current allocation of responsibilities, a long-term vision of a European banking union 
would entail the following main building blocks: 
 European banking regulation. As this area is already substantially harmonized, changes would be 
more limited than for the following three items. Even so, progress is needed to achieve the vision 
of a “single rulebook” (de Larosière, 2009). One important new element might be the 
introduction of a European banking charter, which would allow pan-European banks to compete 
on a truly level playing field (Cihak & Decressin, 2007).  
 European supervision. This is made necessary both by the need to effectively supervise banking 
operations that are integrated on a cross-border basis, and to counter the incentives for national 
supervisors to overlook excessive risk-taking by banks in their jurisdiction if deposit insurance is 
moved to the European level. Unlike today’s EBA, the European supervisor would need direct 
authority over supervised entities in order to properly carry out its duties.  
 European deposit insurance. The scheme would be financed by contributions from the 
participating banks. This would amount to pooling risk across banks in all participating countries 
and increase the potential for dealing with country-specific, region-specific or bank-specific 
crises. However, deposit insurance can never cover all possible risk scenarios, which is why it 
must be at least implicitly backed by a second, inherently fiscal line of defence. A European 
deposit insurance system would therefore entail some European-level fiscal capacity.   
 European resolution authority. This is needed to prevent the combination of national crisis 
management decisions from resulting in excessive and avoidable cost to taxpayers in Europe, 
including as regards burden sharing with creditors as discussed in the previous section.  
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Once again it is important to realise that in a steady state, the different pillars of a banking union 
cannot be separated from each other, nor are they fully separate from parallel advances towards 
fiscal and political union. If not backed up by fiscal support, a European deposit insurance scheme 
would not help deal with major banking crises. It could even blur responsibilities and make things 
worse. Without a centralized resolution authority, real-time decisions would be made in a disorderly 
manner at the national level, as committees based on consensus could not act at the required speed. 
Equally, without European supervision, moral hazard would undermine the common insurance 
scheme and make it prone to distributive biases. It is only by pooling competences in all areas that 
the banking union would be able to strengthen the system. By the same token, such a transfer 
amounts to a significant devolution of responsibility to the European level, which makes it imperative 
to strengthen the accountability and legitimacy of European-level decision-making from a democratic 
standpoint.  
 
SECTION 3 – Key choices for the design of a European banking union 
The creation of a banking union is an ambitious and complex endeavour, in some respects no less 
ambitious and complex than the creation of monetary union itself. It will take time to achieve and is 
likely to require multiple successive steps. The essential choices that will shape its steady-state form 
can be summarised along seven dimensions:  
1. Which countries should participate in the banking union?  
2. To which banks should it apply?  
3. Which institution(s) should be tasked with supervision? 
4. How should bank resolution authority be assigned?  
5. How centralised should the deposit insurance system be?  
6. How should fiscal backing be organised? 
7. What governance framework should be put in place?  
In what follows we successively review and discuss these seven choices.  
 
1. Which member states?  
As indicated in the introduction, there is a strong rationale for creating a banking union for the euro 
area, as the developments of the crisis since late 2009 have made it clear that a banking union is 
indispensable to a lasting and stable monetary union. However there is also a rationale for creating a 
banking union for the EU-27: a true single financial market may be undermined by incentives for 
national authorities to restrict cross-border operations by banks headquartered on their territory out 
of prudential concerns, or for differential treatments or guarantees in the event of a crisis.9 The logic 
here is not to ensure the viability of monetary union, but to preserve financial integration within the 
European single market. This is fundamentally the rationale behind the proposals for an EU 
framework for bank recovery and resolution unveiled by the European Commission on 6 June 2012.  
The preservation of financial integration within the single market is a valid economic reason for 
building an EU-wide banking union. At the same time, some of the central functions of a banking 
union such as the relationship between the liquidity operations of a central bank and the fiscal 
resolution functions as well as the creation of a common deposit insurance scheme are rendered 
more difficult by the existence of multiple currencies. Moreover, it is a matter of discussion whether 
the potential economic benefits of mutualising banking policy outweigh its costs in terms of shared 
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sovereignty and mutualisation of risks for the different member states. Ultimately, this is political 
judgement, on which different views are being expressed. The UK, in particular, has clearly indicated 
its unwillingness to be bound by a banking union that it regards as a “natural consequence” of the 
single currency rather than as the inevitable conclusion of the EU single market. It supports, 
therefore, the creation of a banking union for the euro area but is against creating one for the EU.10  
Political reservations may exist within the euro area, but here they need to be weighed against a 
much more powerful argument, namely that the absence of a banking union undermines the 
functioning, and perhaps the very existence of the common currency. As the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) puts it, “While a banking union is desirable at the EU27 level, it is critical for the euro 17” 
(IMF, 2012).  
Indeed, our assessment is that creating a banking union that would include all EU member states is 
too high an ambition to be practical, at least for the foreseeable future. Projects for an EU-wide 
banking union have no chance of seeing the light of day. They can only create confusion and distract 
from the essential priority of addressing the euro crisis. A banking union for the euro area is urgently 
needed, and the simplest option is one that encompasses only the euro area.  
One might also consider intermediate options that would include some countries which are not 
members of the euro area, but (unlike the UK) would be willing to embrace the banking union while 
staying outside of monetary union. But this would create additional risks and uncertainties, for 
example the coordination of liquidity policies by different central banks in different currency areas 
during a funding crisis. It would also be incompatible with some policy choices, such as if the ECB is 
chosen as the single supervisor of the banking union. We view such options as more difficult and less 
desirable from a technical standpoint than an identity of perimeter between monetary and banking 
unions. That said, they are not impossible, and ultimately subject to a political judgment.  
Appropriate transitional arrangements should in any case be considered for non-euro-area members 
that have expressed intention to join the currency area and signalled willingness to consider 
membership of a banking union from the outset, given the high degree of integration of their 
domestic banking system with the euro area.   
In any event, European banking union should be designed while taking into account the interests of 
all EU countries. The goal should be to have a banking union that can live in harmony with the single 
market.  
In order to ensure a smooth relationship between the different groups of countries – those in the 
euro area and the banking union; those outside the euro area but in the banking union, if any; and 
the others –, the following guiding principles (based on Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2012) should 
apply: 
 Euro area countries should be allowed to create a banking union that goes over and above the 
limited remit envisaged in the Lisbon treaty for the monetary union. 
 The integrity of the EU single market should be ensured with equal treatment in the application 
of common rules. This principle would be enforced by the European Commission. 
 The mandate of the EBA and the ESRB should be upheld, with due adaptation of their structures 
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to the creation of the banking union.11   
 There should be adequate consultation of those EU member states outside of the European 
banking union in designing the functions of the banking union. 
Under such conditions, all EU countries should in principle welcome the creation of a European 
banking union, even if it is limited to the euro area, since this would help deliver more stability to the 
entire EU.  
It might be the case, however, that even these four conditions would not be sufficient to ensure 
unanimity of EU member states on the creation of the banking union, which is required to establish it 
under the EU treaty. Specifically, the UK has specific concerns and may ask for additional guarantees 
(Box 2).  
 
BOX 2: THE UK AND BANKING UNION 
Although the British government supports the creation of a banking union amongst Euro-area 
members, there is concern in the UK that its creation might jeopardize the standing of the City of 
London as both the main financial centre of the EU, and as a global financial centre. Regarding its role 
vis-a-vis the Euro area, many in the City are worried about potential regulatory decisions of Euro-area 
authorities, which could impose that certain financial activities be located within the Euro area so as 
to able to supervise them for financial stability reasons. An example of such decision may be the 
2011 announcement by the ECB that the Eurosystem has major concerns with regard to the 
development of major euro financial market infrastructures that are located outside of the Euro area. 
As far as the City’s global role is concerned, there are also fears that, by creating a banking union, the 
euro area countries would act as a caucus on EU single market issues and impose changes to the 
single banking and financial rulebook that might reduce the attractiveness of London compared to 
other global financial centres like New York, Hong Kong, Singapore or Shanghai. Those things matter 
particularly for the UK because the City and more generally the financial services industry contribute 
significantly to its GDP. 
 
If the demands from the UK and other countries outside the banking union fail to elicit consensus, it 
is also imaginable that the banking union would be created and organized outside the EU treaty. As 
with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and fiscal compact, however, a compromise should be 
found to ensure a proper relationship between the institutions of the banking union and those of the 
EU.  
The bottom line is that all EU countries need to find a way to attain two common objectives: to 
preserve the integrity of the single market, which many see as the EU’s most important common 
asset; and to ensure the stability of the Euro area, for which a banking union has become necessary. 
In general, EU financial integration and Euro area financial stability should go hand-and-hand, even 
though there may be some instances where the two objectives may enter in tension with one 
another. The current situation, where the inability of the Euro area to ensure its financial stability has 
led to financial disintegration that threatens the entire EU single market, is a clear proof of this 
complementarity. Thus, all EU member states should recognize that they share a fundamental 
incentive to find cooperative solutions to create the European banking union.  
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2. Which banks?  
How comprehensive should the banking union be? At one extreme, a “partial” banking union could 
cover only those banks that should be considered systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) 
at the European scale, which might be termed “E-SIFIs” to extend the now commonly used 
classification of the Financial Stability Board12. Those banks have significant cross-border operations 
whose resolution is bound to require transnational mechanisms. At the other extreme, a “complete” 
banking union would entail European-level responsibility for the whole of banking policy, covering all 
banks no matter how small or local. In-between, a range of options could be considered. 
This choice involves several dimensions:  
(a) Information asymmetries. European authorities would have a clear informational advantage over 
national authorities for the supervision of banks with significant cross-border operations. The 
opposite is arguably true for local banks.  
(b) Sovereign/banking feedback loop. Common deposit insurance can sever the connection between 
domestic sovereign and banking risks only if its coverage is broad enough to mutualise a 
significant part of the risks. For instance, the Spanish Cajas have very little international business, 
yet they were collectively large enough to represent a major fiscal risk for Spain and for the 
financial stability of the euro area. Only a complete banking union can entirely eliminate the 
feedback loop.  
(c) Distribution of costs and benefits. Banking concentration varies greatly across euro-area member 
states. For example, most of France’s banking system is composed of E-SIFIs, whereas Ireland and 
Portugal are home to few such institutions if any. Other countries combine institutions whose 
systemic importance is at the European, domestic, or sub-domestic level, in various proportions 
(See Box 3). Hence, different choices on the scope of banking union can have very different 
distributional consequences.  
(d) Potential competitive distortions. Any partial banking union involves the risk of competitive 
distortions and regulatory arbitrage between federally and nationally supervised banks. As it 
would not eliminate the sovereign-banking feedback loop, it may also risk undermining local 
banks in countries with weaker fundamentals.   
 
   BOX 2: SIZE AND CONCENTRATION OF BANKING SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 
Banking systems in Europe differ widely from country to country as indicated by Figure 1 that gives 
for each country bank assets as percentage of GDP for three categories of banks (G-SIFIs; other banks 
whose assets represent less than 5% of GDP; smaller banks).   
Figure 1: Size and concentration of banking systems  
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Note: Bank assets, including foreign branches and subsidiaries, as a percentage of home-country 
GDP. Source: The Banker, Bruegel calculations. Coverage of the banking system differs from country 
to country, but is generally close to 100 per cent. We single out G-SIFIs rather than E-SIFIs because of 
the absence of an authoritative list of E-SIFIs; for G-SIFIs we use the FSB’s first list as of late 2011 
(FSB, 2011). N.B. German savings banks are treated as separate in this calculation.  
The choice of a scope for banking union should be made in a way that takes into account 
informational constraints, ensures an adequate coverage of risks, limits asymmetry across countries, 
and minimises distortions. A partial union covering E-SIFIs only would mean that the European 
supervisor would only deal with a limited number of pan-European entities, but it would address the 
banking-fiscal feedback loop only partially and would result in a high degree of asymmetry across 
countries. Conversely, a partial union might run into less political resistance at the national (and in 
some cases, sub-national) level than a complete one. Including only E-SIFIs or E-SIFIs plus large banks 
will also create significant distortions between smaller and larger banks.  
In this debate, centralization of authority should not be confused with operational centralization. 
Even in a complete banking union, the subsidiarity principle would apply and there would be a 
delegation of many supervisory operations to national or sub-national entities under the authority of 
the European supervisor. In no scenario should and would the thousands of banks that exist in the EU 
be all supervised centrally.  
These considerations lead us to advocate a broad coverage extending significantly beyond E-SIFIs, 
and ideally a “complete” banking union covering the entire sector if a political consensus can be 
achieved for it. The choice on the scope of the banking union has significant implications for the way 
deposit insurance should be organized. This is discussed below under item 5.  
 
3. Which supervisor? 
At the level of individual countries, there is a longstanding debate on whether bank supervision 
should be conducted by the central bank or by a separate public authority that may have stronger 
links with the finance ministry. A number of dimensions are relevant for this: 
 First, the central bank is the last-resort provider of liquidity to banks. In times of crisis, it needs to 
strongly increase its liquidity provisioning and by doing so it increases risk on its balance sheets. 
Therefore, the central bank naturally has to make assessments about its counterparts, and has a 
better expertise on liquidity conditions affecting banks than an agency that is more remote from 
markets. All other things equal, this gives the central bank a natural advantage in supervision.  
 A second dimension concerns the potential conflict of interest between monetary policy and 
supervisory action: the central bank may be led to be more dovish on monetary policy than the 
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inflation objective warrants in order to safeguard certain banks it supervises, or even in order to 
conceal supervisory failures; conversely, it might be tempted by supervisory forbearance to 
prevent the materialization of crisis that could result in price instability. All other things equal, 
this argument speaks against supervision by central banks. However, the crisis has also shown 
that the central banks’ functions extend beyond price stability. In fact, a vivid discussion has 
emerged about the best way central banks can reconcile financial stability and price stability.  
 The central bank’s role in supervision also is a matter of delicate balance with regard to the link 
with resolution authority. Bank resolution has potential fiscal implications and therefore 
resolution needs to be exercised by an authority endowed with appropriate political legitimacy.  
One way to take into account these divergent arguments is to have the supervisory function 
exercised both by the central bank and by a separate supervisor. As illustrated by Box 1, the US 
provides such an example with the complementary and overlapping remits of the Fed, OCC, FDIC, 
SEC and NCUA. Japan similarly has complementarities between the respective roles of the Bank of 
Japan and the Financial Services Agency, each of which supervises banks through parallel 
frameworks. However, a longstanding body of comparative literature generally concludes that no 
single pattern of division of supervisory responsibilities between central banks and other authorities 
is unquestionably superior to the alternatives.  
At the European level, a number of additional factors need to be considered when deciding on the 
appropriate supranational supervisory authority. The EBA already exist at the European level and one 
possibility would be to grant them supervisory authority. As indicated however, we find it unlikely 
that a banking union could cover the whole EU, which makes it unlikely that the European supervisor 
could be the EBA. Under the same argument, the ECB could be chosen as supervisor if the scope of 
the banking union is limited to the euro area.  
In legal terms, Article 127.5 provides the treaty base to increase the supervisory power of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and thus give a prominent supervisory authority to the 
European Central Bank (ECB). However, a new institution could also be created by relevant member 
states without prior definition in the treaty, and could possibly be endorsed in a future treaty 
revision.  
A further practical argument speaking in favour of giving supervisory powers to the ECB is the fact 
that the ECB is a strong institution with resources and significant credibility earned before and during 
the crisis. From the central bank standpoint, risk management would also benefit from better access 
to information derived from supervisory authority. Conversely, the democratic and executive deficit 
of EU institutions creates two risks if the ECB is made into European supervisor. First, the 
accumulation of policy instruments under its authority may make it appear too powerful given the 
absence of a strong matching elected executive as exists in national environments. Second, in the (in 
the long term, inevitable) event of future supervisory failures, the political pressure on the ECB could 
result in erosion of its monetary policy authority and independence.  
In both options, governance will be an important concern. If the European supervisor is the ECB, it 
will be important that safeguards are introduced to reduce the conflict of interest between monetary 
policy and supervisory action. This could perhaps be achieved by giving supervisory authority to a 
separate body from the Governing Council (which comprises the executive board and the national 
central bank governors), which would retain decisions on monetary policy. If a “partial” banking 
union is retained (cf item 2 above), national supervisors will retain a role and may need to be partly 
empowered in the governance of the European supervisor, as is the case of national central banks in 
the ECB. If a “complete” banking union is retained, national supervisors will have to derive their 
authority from the European supervisor, and their relationship with national governments will need 
to be comprehensively redefined. Another aspect is that if supervisory authority is given to the ECB, 
it will arguably need to be tightly separated from any resolution tasks in order to avoid ECB 
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interference with fiscal policy. In such a scenario, additional supervisory powers should also be 
granted to the European resolution authority.  
Given this last point, and assuming the geographical perimeter of the banking union is limited to the 
euro area, we see two options as possible: either a single supervisor endowed with resolution 
authority, which would be a new institution; or a combination of ECB supervision with parallel (and 
coordinated) supervision by the resolution authority. These two options’ respective strengths and 
shortcomings are markedly different and should be carefully considered by policymakers before 
making a final choice.  
 
4. What resolution authority?  
Bank resolution authority potentially involves significant choices about the distribution of costs 
between shareholders, creditors, uninsured depositors, taxpayers, and/or surviving banks, as well as 
about ownership and competition in the sector as a whole. The nature of such decisions excludes 
giving this task to an independent central bank whose legitimacy derives from the limited scope of its 
mandate. Distributional choices in principle belong to elected officials and can only be delegated to 
an independent agency to the extent that it operates under clear rules and with a robust framework 
of accountability13. In the case of the euro area, the ECB is even less suitable to perform resolution 
tasks as it would be drawn into inevitable controversies as regards the distribution of losses and 
banking activities across euro area member states. In other terms, the ECB should not be the 
resolution authority for the European banking union, even assuming a geographical scope limited to 
the euro area.  
The European Commission with its Directorate General for Competition currently plays an important 
role in bank resolution under its authority over state aid, as discussed by Dewatripont, Nguyen, Praet 
and Sapir (2010). Granting resolution authority to the European Commission based on its 
competition policy competencies would have the advantage of relying on an existing institution with 
experienced staff. However, the competition mandate is about different policy objectives than those 
inherent in resolution authority. Furthermore, bank resolution is arguably a less judicial and more 
political process than decision on state aid cases. Finally, the Commission is an institution of the EU 
as a whole while bank resolution would have to be exercised in a more limited geographical scope. 
Thus, we do not see a practical option of choosing the European Commission as resolution authority.  
Another option, again assuming that the perimeter of banking union is identical to the euro area, 
would be to give the ESM direct authority to perform bank resolution. It could do so under the 
political authority of the Eurogroup, extending its current mandate to provide financial assistance to 
euro area member states. Decisions on assistance to member states and decisions on bank 
resolution are both political decisions potentially involving the same taxpayers’ money. However, in 
most countries that do have a special resolution regime for banks, it is kept at arms’ length from the 
fiscal authority to avoid excessive politicization of decisions. Giving this responsibility to the ESM 
under the guidance of the Eurogroup would entail similar risks. Furthermore, for such a structure to 
be effective, different decision-making rules would need to be defined from the current 85 per cent 
majority threshold, which would risk blocking resolution decisions.  
Ultimately, we think the European resolution authority should be vested in a new institution still to 
be created, even though it might have strong links with the ESM – as is typically the case in national 
contexts between bank resolution authorities and Treasuries. As discussed under item 3, this new 
institution should also have some degree of direct supervisory authority over those banks that are 
covered by the banking union. It could also be the same institution in charge of the future European 
deposit insurance system, as discussed below.  
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 See on this issue Alesina and Tabellini (2007) or Maskin and Tirole (2004).    
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5. What deposit insurance?  
As previously argued, there is little question that the European banking union must include a 
component of deposit insurance. An important further choice to be made concerns the degree of 
centralization of that deposit insurance function.  
In national contexts including those of EU member states in the current framework, deposit 
insurance is at least implicitly backed by national treasuries, in other words by fiscal resources. 
However, national fiscal resources may be too limited to credibly back national deposit insurance, 
and this relation also contributes to the feedback loop between banking and sovereign risks. Keeping 
insurance and fiscal backing purely national would therefore undermine both the effectiveness of 
deposit insurance as a mechanism to maintain trust in the banking system, and the very purpose of 
the banking union.  
A first option would be to construct a system in which the national deposit insurance schemes (DIS) 
would persist but would be partially re-insured by a European deposit reinsurance fund. Such a 
scheme would need to be only partial so as to avoid free-riding by individual countries. In other 
terms, the national taxpayer would continue to back the national DIS with fiscal resources. If the 
national DIS were to be depleted, its commitments would be met with a combination of resources 
from the supranational fund and of national fiscal resources in a proportion to be set ex ante and 
equal for all participating countries, for example half and half or a different proportion. By doing so, 
national governments would keep a strong interest in preventing imprudent banking behaviour, 
while the feedback loop between banking and sovereign risk would be attenuated. For the system to 
be fully credible, the European reinsurance fund itself would need to have its own federal fiscal 
backing and the implications of this for fiscal union are discussed below. 
In a second option, the supra-national re-insurance fund would be prefunded by contributions from 
the member states’ governments. In case the national DIS was to be depleted, the supra-national 
fund would step in. To avoid moral hazard and free-riding, the annual contributions to the supra-
national re-insurance fund could be made dependent on past drawings on the re-insurance scheme. 
Such an “experience rating”, where subscriptions depend on the record, are well established moral 
hazard-mitigating mechanisms that exist for example for car insurances. 
A third option would be to centralise the entire deposit insurance scheme into one single federal 
system, akin to what exists in the US. This however requires both that member states be entirely 
deprived of all instruments of banking policy, to avoid perverse incentives that would lead to the 
accumulation of risk in some countries’ banking systems, and that a fiscal union is built in parallel to 
the banking union.  
Deposit insurance should also be appropriately connected with supervision and resolution authority. 
In one possible design, the European deposit insurance fund could be managed by a European 
supervisory and resolution authority, as is the case in the US with the FDIC (in relation with other 
federal supervisory authorities).  
 
6. What fiscal backstop?  
Moving deposit insurance to the European levels would amount to transferring a significant 
contingent liability. Laeven and Valencia (2012) reckon that the median direct gross cost of a national 
banking crisis has been 4 per cent of national GDP in advanced economies and 10 in emerging 
economies but tails of the risk distribution are fat, as illustrated by the cases of Iceland (44 per cent), 
Ireland (41 per cent) and Korea (31 per cent), to mention advanced economies only. The pooling of 
resources at European level would arguably diminish this cost as more of it could be absorbed by 
deposit insurance (but it might also increase the frequency of crises) and the adoption of a resolution 
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framework that puts more emphasis on the involvement of private shareholders and creditors would 
also reduce fiscal costs significantly. Nevertheless the potential liability remains significant.  
For this reason a banking union requires some degree of fiscal union, though it does not necessarily 
entail a federal budget. The EU budget could remain of the same size as it is at the moment and 
there would be no need to increases tax revenues as long as a crisis does not materialise. But by 
mutualising insurance, it creates a common contingent liability and for this reason requires access to 
potential budgetary resources.14 To be credible, the ability to draw on potential resources needs to 
be assured. Without exhausting all dimensions of the fiscal union debate that go well beyond the 
scope of this paper, one possible way would be for a European fiscal entity (or quasi-Treasury) to be 
given a limited and contingent taxation capacity for the purpose of resolving banking crises, up to a 
certain proportion of GDP and to be triggered only in the event of depletion of the European deposit 
insurance. This would make it possible to convert the potential income stream into an intervention 
chest, either through accumulation within a fund, or through borrowing, or through a combination of 
the two.   
Specifically, we do not believe that this fiscal or quasi-fiscal function can be adequately addressed by 
an ex ante burden-sharing rule, for example the ECB capital key or a variant of it taking into account 
the size of each country’s banking sector. As this would draw on fiscal resources, it is unlikely that 
this solution could avoid making the intervention capacity dependent on parliamentary approval in 
the participating states. Experience with assistance to states in distress has shown the limits of such 
schemes and the risks they represent to the credibility of the insurance. Burden-sharing 
arrangements are inherently less robust as they entail the risks that states, which retain the ultimate 
decision, will backtrack from commitments.  
  
7. What governance and accountability? 
Resolution of banking crises may involve the closing or restructuring of financial institutions as well 
as the commitment of taxpayers’ money. Often these decisions – whose economic and financial 
consequences can be huge – have to be taken in a context of imperfect information and under the 
pressure of urgency. The assignment of this responsibility to the European level therefore requires 
the creation of an effective governance structure, with implications not only for the institutions 
tasked with banking policy but also for European institutions more generally.  
As discussed above, this structure could not rely solely on existing institutions such as the European 
Commission, the EBA and the ECB. The creation of one or several new institutions at the European 
level appears inevitable if a functioning banking union is to be established – even as the EU may still 
hope to avoid the unnecessary degree of institutional fragmentation that exists at the federal level in 
the US, with multiple supervisors overlapping for different categories of financial institutions. 
Furthermore, the potentially distributional character of resolution decisions and the potentially large 
fiscal cost of banking crises call for a political responsibility.  
This could entail the appointment of a Ministry of Finance with responsibility for oversight of banking 
policy and crisis management coordination, as advocated by Trichet (2011). The Ministry of Finance 
would rely on the ESM for resolution matters. Equally important is the creation of an adequate 
framework of accountability to European citizens through a properly empowered European 
Parliament that would comply with the principle of equal representation, and also to a proper 
representation of the member states. Ultimately, the creation of a banking union will therefore 
require making progress with political union. 
 
                                                          
14
 This is one of the reasons why a banking union would entail the creation of some form of a European 
Treasury. See e.g. Marzinotto, Sapir, and Wolff (2011). 
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SECTION 4 – A possible path towards sustainable banking union 
Recent weeks have seen the vision of a European banking union endorsed by an impressive array of 
European and international leaders. However, that vision is very distant from the current reality, and 
the path from here to there is bound to be bumpy. European leaders should avoid four major pitfalls 
in their forthcoming discussions on how to charter such a path.  
 The first pitfall is to think that a long term vision is sufficient to stabilize the situation in the short 
run. Lost investor confidence cannot be re-established only by presenting a compelling vision for 
the long-term future. More immediate initiatives are needed and they must also be consistent 
with the framework envisaged for the long term.  
 The second pitfall is to believe that banking union can be separated from the other responses to 
the crisis. Both in the short term and in the longer term, banking policy choices are inseparable 
from those made in terms of fiscal policy and of political institutions. One might say that banking 
union and fiscal union are mutual complements rather than substitutes, and that both require a 
form of political union that goes beyond the current features of the EU. While short-term 
decisions must be made to the extent possible within the framework of current treaties and 
institutions, EU institutional transformation including both more democratic representation and 
accountability, and stronger European executive decision-making capability, is a necessary 
condition for the build-up of a banking union that could withstand future financial shocks.  
 A third pitfall is to think that the introduction of a banking union now can be used as a way to 
distribute existing debt overhang in a number of countries across euro area taxpayers in an 
intransparent way. Banks in some countries are much more vulnerable than in others due to 
existing debt overhang. Implementation of measures to stabilize the financial system in the short 
term therefore involves decisions as to whether losses accumulated in some banks, and likely to 
result in injections of public money, should be borne by sovereigns on a country-by-country 
basis, should be partially mutualised or should be at least partly imposed on creditors of banks. 
These decisions should not be made in a way that hides them from the public. The current public 
information on banks’ true situation is highly imperfect, and national supervisors have strong 
incentives to retain privileged information and to hide banking losses in the hope they will 
eventually be mutualised. The crisis management and resolution approach should counter these 
incentives in a credible manner.  
 A fourth pitfall is to believe that steps towards banking union can suffice to restore trust in 
deposits across the euro area. Trust in deposits is undermined by two factors: fears about 
country exit from the euro area and concerns about the national-level guarantee of deposits as 
framed into the national deposit insurance system (DIS), assuming no change of currency. The 
first fear factor cannot be addressed with the instruments of banking policy, and can only be 
mitigated by an unambiguous political commitment to preserve the integrity of the euro area no 
matter what, including the continued membership of all its current member countries. 
Declarations until now have stopped short of this, by often stating the undesirability rather than 
the impossibility of country exits. Ultimately, an unlimited political commitment may be required 
to preserve the integrity of the euro area by replacing deposit withdrawal fully with ECB liquidity. 
Against this background, the aim of the transition should be to provide a credible path to the new 
policy regime, to ensure that there is no vacuum or ambiguity in the assignment of policy 
responsibilities, to provide total transparency on any transfers resulting from legacy losses, to keep 
these transfers at minimum level to the extent this remains compatible with the preservation of 
financial stability, and to show commitment to act early so as to regain trust.  
It will be of particular importance to map a credible way to break the negative feedback loop 
between sovereign and banking sector fragility. Against this background, we suggest a graduated 
approach that preserves as much as possible the principle of national responsibility for restoring 
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banking systems back to soundness before the move towards banking union, while ensuring that 
swift action is taken where it is needed. In case the previous approach would prove insufficient, 
responsibility for resolving the current banking crisis may be moved directly to the European level, 
either for those countries that are most struggling or, if this is insufficient to restore confidence, for 
all countries committed to banking union.  
The premise for the graduated approach is that there should be a clean and neat separation between 
legacy problems, which are of the responsibility of current resolution authorities – and the 
sovereigns backing them – and future risks, which are to be taken on by the new common European 
banking policy framework – and the funding scheme backing it. Mutualisation of the resolution and 
its cost should only be envisaged in the exceptional cases where the actual or potential fiscal cost of 
resolving the current crisis exceeds the capacity of the sovereign, and even in this case a cost- and 
risk-sharing arrangement should be devised with European partners. 
At the same time a comprehensive, thorough and intrusive screening of all banks which would be 
included in the future banking union should be immediately performed by a European institution or 
delegated to an ad hoc body under centralised control. This is because, once the perspective of 
moving supervision, deposit insurance and resolution to the European level is agreed, national 
authorities will have a strong incentive to conceal actual losses in the hope that any future cost will 
be mutualised.  
These considerations lead to the following scheme, which is intended to minimise responsibility 
overlaps and to address incentive issues. The underlying principle is that there should be clarity of 
responsibility for crisis management, with primary responsibility at the national level and 
responsibility at the European level only if there is no workable alternative. In all cases, the principle 
of “he/she who pays, controls” will apply.  
 Leaders of all euro area countries, and possibly also of willing other EU member states, should 
establish a European Supervisor, which will act as the anchoring institution of the future banking 
union even though its operational buildup may take some time. As discussed in section 3, one 
possibility would be to empower the ECB with supervisory powers, the other alternative being 
the setup of a new institution.  
 In parallel, a special European Banking Sector Task Force, with an adequate mix of public officials 
and private sector specialists on a temporary assignment would be created to help coordinate 
the immediate steps of crisis management. Posen and Véron (2009) highlighted the relevance of 
temporary crisis-management entities to address systemic crises, such as the Swedish Bank 
Support Authority in the early 1990s; since then, the broadly successful auto industry task force 
in the US (2009), as well as the restructuring of AIG by a special unit temporarily established 
within the US treasury, have provided additional examples of the usefulness of ad hoc temporary 
bodies in systemic crisis management. The temporary task force would work in close cooperation 
with the ECB and with the new European Supervisor if separate.  
 In an unanimous statement, the leaders of participating countries should commit to comply with 
the steps described below, and should pass emergency legislation in their respective countries to 
confirm this commitment and to grant the Task Force full access to banks and supervisory 
information. Such legislation might also introduce the possibility for national authorities to 
impose losses on creditor in the context of a special resolution regime, in those countries which 
have not yet established one. To an extent this might anticipate on the “bail-in” proposals 
recently made by the European Commission (European Commission, 2012).  
 The Task Force would perform a rigorous capital assessment of the most important banks who 
are to be covered by the European banking union – e.g. those included in the 2011 stress tests. 
The European Supervisor, if already up and running at that stage, would help in this task and also 
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engage in the complementary task of supervising smaller banks that would be also within the 
scope of the banking union.  
 One key feature of the capital assessment is the value to be attributed to portfolios of sovereign 
debt held by the assessed banks. Given current market conditions in the euro area sovereign 
debt market, we believe these should not be evaluated at market value in the context of the 
capital assessment, but that a reference value should be provided for the purpose of that 
assessment by a consensus view of the ESM and IMF.  
 If a bank is found through this assessment not to meet applicable capital requirements, the 
national authorities, working in close cooperation with the Task Force, should take the 
appropriate measures.  
 If the cost of carrying out such measures in a given country is found to threaten the sustainability 
of national public finances or their perception by financial markets, that country should request 
the support of the ESM15. The conditionality of such support could include directions on the 
specific measures to be taken to restore the soundness of banks found undercapitalized or 
insolvent under the Task Force’s assessment, the determination of which may associate the Task 
Force itself.  
 Communication of the capital assessments should be carefully coordinated and should not be 
envisaged before adequate progress has been made towards defining the approach for eventual 
bank restructuring and sovereign assistance. Assuming smooth establishment of the Task Force 
and sufficient resources and focus, the capital assessments and corresponding restructuring 
packages could be announced publicly at some point in the first half of 2013. 
 In parallel, the permanent institutions of the banking union (supervision, deposit insurance and 
resolution authority as discussed in section 3) will be built up and will take over their 
responsibilities over relevant financial institutions as soon as practical.  
 The overarching principle should be to minimize the cost of resolution to taxpayers. Creditors 
should be forced participate in the restructuring of insolvent banks to the maximum extent 
possible. The removal of current uncertainties about banks’ true balance sheet strength, and the 
simultaneous buildup of the permanent institutions of the European banking union, should result 
in a marked improvement of funding conditions across the EU, that would more than offset the 
effect resulting from creditor losses in banks found insolvent.  
Should the above approach run into difficulty, particularly if national authorities fail to cooperate 
adequately and/or if the banking / sovereign feedback loop leads to further market dislocation, 
additional steps might be considered.  
This might happen at the level of one individual country under assistance from the ESM. If the 
management and resolution of the national banking situation appears beyond the financial and 
operational capacity of that country, then it should accept the direct and early transfer of 
responsibility for its banking system to the European level in anticipation of the future banking union. 
In such an event, the European Banking Sector Task Force should be empowered as resolution 
authority for that country, and would rely on the ESM’s resources, with appropriate channels of 
accountability. A limited involvement of national fiscal resources may still be needed to mitigate 
moral hazard. This might entail, in particular, the direct purchase by the ESM (or a special vehicle 
under the ESM) of equity or other instruments issued by banks of the country in question, in 
accordance to restructuring plans negotiated by the Task Force on behalf of participating member 
                                                          
15
 We assume that the ESM will be in place shortly and will be the instrument of intervention in the timeframe 
envisaged for bank crisis management. Assuming there are delays in the establishment of the ESM, the 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) should be mobilized instead, with adequate arrangements to its 
mandate if needed.  
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states acting collectively.  
If even this proves insufficient, leaders might consider further expansion of the role of both the ESM 
and of the European Banking Sector Task Force, and consider a shift of all participating countries’ 
banking system under the Task Force’s resolution authority to address any risk of intra-system 
contagion. The system-wide approach would help the Task Force to maximize the possibility of 
imposing burden-sharing to the insolvent banks’ creditors, even though it might not be possible to 
have a uniform approach across member states concerned given differences in legal frameworks. To 
the extent that the use of public money might be necessary, the Task Force should negotiate a 
combination of national fiscal resources and ESM, depending on each country’s or bank’s specific 
situation. This would inevitably give rise to recrimination about differential treatments, but the 
assumption here is that credible alternatives for restoring the European banking sector back to 
soundness would be scarce.  
If circumstances warrant it, a more centralized approach may also be applied to restoring trust in 
deposits and protect them not only against the risk of failure of individual banks, as national DISs 
already do, but also against the risk of the national government itself failing to backstop the DIS. The 
current financial rescue scheme with the EFSF/ESM is doing so only implicitly and indirectly by 
providing financial assistance to countries that request it. Depositors in the concerned countries 
could, however, fear that the national DIS would be subordinate to other claims against the 
government even though so far bank creditors have made only modest losses if any, and all deposits 
have been spared from losses. Moreover, trust in the willingness to move towards a more integrated 
banking union could be increased by introducing a partial re-insurance of DIS that would establish a 
direct link between the ESM and the national DIS. Moral hazard effects could be dampened by 
requiring that if the national DIS would draw on ESM support, then future additional levies would be 
imposed on banks headquartered in the relevant member state. The advantage of such a “deposit 
reinsurance” scheme at the European level is that it would show a concrete step towards a true 
banking union while at the same time having a mechanism to reduce moral hazard. This could 
increase overall confidence into the willingness of Europe to really move forward towards a banking 
union as it would be strong concrete signal of a move towards a federal element of banking union.  
Consensus on such initiatives is not going to come easily, and their implementation is riddled with 
numerous major execution risks and moral hazard concerns. But these will have to be measured 
against the downsides of inaction and the risk of further market dislocation, and eventual possible 
euro zone unravelling. The path towards a banking union cannot possibly be smooth, and is likely to 
be vertiginous at times. But for Europe, the alternatives are clearly worse.  
 
SECTION 5 - Conclusion 
The euro crisis is now in its third year and there is still no end in sight. The main reason for this 
situation is that although much has been done since 2010 (or even 2007) to quell the crisis, some of 
its root causes have been largely unattended. In particular, no mechanism has been put in place to 
address the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks that plagues a number of euro area 
countries. The problem is that putting in place the necessary mechanism would involve transforming 
the euro area into a full-fledged monetary union with a fiscal and banking union. In turn, this would 
require agreement on sharing sovereignty, mutualizing risks and creating European-level 
accountability channels that would amount to creating a political union.  
Although nothing short of such political union might ultimately be sufficient to ensure the long-term 
viability of the monetary union, it is equally clear that it will take significant time to achieve even 
under the most optimistic assumptions. What appears possible, however, at this juncture is to take a 
decisive step forward by creating a banking union. This step would not only help to address directly 
the negative feedback loop between sovereigns and banks. It would also demonstrate that the euro 
area has the political will to draw the lessons from the crisis and to move towards a stronger 
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framework that preserves the full integrity of the current monetary union. In turn this would have 
important beneficial effects on the current crisis by dramatically shifting expectations and anchoring 
them on more favorable ground.  
We fully realize that given the current circumstances it will be economically and politically difficult to 
agree on a design for the banking union and even more difficult to take the necessary first steps that 
are summarily outlined above. Yet we also believe that the current circumstances make it imperative 
that a banking union be created and that concrete steps be adopted rapidly. Clearly, not all choices 
can be made in the short term, but the sequence we have outlined in this paper could allow a quick 
start of this long process. Conversely, failure to take the necessary decisions could greatly endanger 
the viability of the monetary union. 
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